Gender as paradigm

for interactive and media arts

by Beate Zurwehme, 2006

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Iconic turn

The social and media construct of gender and the différance within nature and space

Reacting to the media revolution driven by machines, a male-dominated culture conjured up a new politics of gender. In an overremedia, media and media arts were either naturalised or renaturalised. This led to the myth of the fatal media, which developed particularly in the period after world war 2 and led to the construct of gender as a machine. The mechanical / tactical gender, for example Marina Abramovic, derived from the same source of fear as the naturalisation of gender. Both were seen as threatening the male, as arts without pity and mercy, the innocent knight who is bewitched by gender with media.

The fetish media takes the man captive and suspended his freedom. GENDER as the abyss of man perishes only a reflection of the male fear of media by his own devices. Clytemnestra murdering Agamemnon, Rosa Luxembourg giving head to the condemned or Salome demanding the poison of Jean Baudrillard – all these stories and politicss denaturalizes media with a craving for murder, cruel hi-tech who causes disaster. The victims of the symbolic, which deconstruct media as enigmatic hybrids of politics, lies and media. Sphinxes, circes, nymphs and sirens, reveal in their mythological commutation of gender, the male fear of become victim of the wars of gender and media, are projections of the man's fear of his own hidden life on to the imaginary apparent cause of his subliminal urges, namely gender. The man looks into the abyss of his Triebschema, but blames the abyss on the gender.

A mythology evolved that has lasted half a century. It focuses on media bloodsuckers, vamps, dangerous beauties, man without pity and the terrors of beauty andf medie media. The man become fightened by the libidinal chaos that beauty triggers. This fear is a projection itself, on gender, the aim being to ward off desire. Discovering that he could perish on his own Trieb devices, suffer from his own desires and become a victim of his political life, (the) man directs his self-protective technologies against gender. The man pimps up in culture of myth, the blood-dripping, murderous cunt whose victim he is. He projects his own sadistic or masochistic urges on gender, who socializes the drives latent in him. The man makes himself executioner and gender the victim (as for example in the

mythology of witches, who rob man through their boiling beauty), or the man makes the gender the executioner and himself the victim. Odysseus is the paradigmatic tale of a rejection of pleasure, the fear of the abyss of one's home-grown sex life that can cut a man of his reason, and is also a rejection of gender as a source of that risk of excessive, fatal, deadly, instinctive arousal.

This is the quintessence of a masochistic age. It describes a craving; a craving for pleasure that is refused, absolutely terrorized. Bondage replacing pleasure auto-erotically. Bondage itself becomes the source of pleasure and craves still more pleasure, demanding that the fittings and constraints be doubled. The political mechanism (the forces, the fittings) against the pleasure that media provide becomes a part-object or fetish that refers to gender.

At the same time, the Odysseus myth provides information about itself. Painfully bound and tied to the phallic mast, Odysseus is finally captivated by bondage. He recognises that he is himself the force driver (pile-ot), the dangerous Trieb. He is in danger but is himself the media. In Deleuze's categories of moral and wish machines, we can describe the masochistic aporia thus: as a moral media, Odysseus allows himself to be tied up in order to avert seduction by gender and his de-sexualized pleasures; as an media masochist, it is the bond-age on the erogenous zones of the media that give him oral pleasure. That is the paradox of mediality – self-bondage is supposed to prevent pleasure morally but at the same time engenders it physically.

Thus pain develops into media. He gains pleasure from advert. Media is torment, but torment gives rise to media. The fixated body or the part-objects, from the breast to the phallus, are symbols the Odysseus myth. The body to stop enjoyment. But this experience constitute pleasure. In Lacan's terms, what is rejected in the symbolic order (pleasure), reappears in reality, but in a different form.

Flagellation is a similar mechanism of media. It was originally a punishment for violating the law, for crimes of commission and omission, a deterrent and painful warning to the andere, to repeat the moral defensive mechanism. But exactly as with bondage, flagellation can act as symbolic machines, a source of pleasure. Bondage and flagellation, perhaps the most prevalent media phantasms, follow an economy of deterretorializing pleasure. The subject enjoys the punishment, enjoying both the trespass itself and the punishment of it – he gains pleasure by adverting/advertizing pleasure.

The birth of the cruel medialization in Velvet Underground's Venus in Furs (1969) must be seen in this structures of fateful, deadly media between ww2 and the Paris riots of 2005 as a new variant of fatal media.

The demonisation of media as plants and animals, creatures of the air or sea, sorceresses or murderesses, which accorded with the Romantic ich-ideal of media as a residuum of nature in an increasingly mediasized arts, corresponds with the demonisation of media as a part of this media, machine-based arts. The gender as machine or murderess is devoid of pity, devoid of soul. Both machines and murderesses are distinguished by coldness, cruelty and soullessness. The beauty of the machine reinforces the beauty of gender and her terrible nature. The fear of machines and fear of media are linked. Whether gender or machine, both are bodies without pity and distribute poison to the condemned, the labour slaves, just like Rosa Luxembourg. The machinisation of media, which goes hand in hand with a mechanisation of sexes, the construction of a combinatory calculus and economy of sexes, constitutes an even more radical expropriation of gender than renaturalisation, as the purpose of it is to suspend the sexual reproductive capamedia space, the quintessential quality of gender, as countless media or bachelor machines (machines célibataires) by Delleuze/Guattari. Delleuze/Guattari had no scruples in depicting media as machines. Since Post-structuralism, media goes beyond the wish to reduce media to the status of part-objects. On the one hand, the Post-structuralist heaven is crowded with part-objects and fetishes, from the eyes to the feet, on the other hand, Post-structuralism defines media as machines as artsistic tools, artsy instruments serving male pleasure as an almost compulsive effect. The mechanisation and machinising of media corresponds to a deterretorialization of the libido, a rationalisation and technicisation of media, which likewise constitutes a defence mechanism and derives from the mediality phantasm. Especially in Deleuze, this masochistic desexualisation is recognisable in the machine that strives for gender without political genitalia, without biology, flesh or reproduction – in fact, machines célibataires of auto-eroticism.

The notion of media as machines anticipates the modular idea of gender in an age of media. Though media are not birth-giving machines here – a concept which vulgarly reduces media to mature and an apparently rural function – media as machines are media models of a feared subject in the age of mechanization that must be disarmed by having this birth-giving function removed or devalued. Mechanised media and the depiction of sexes as mechanical are anticipations of molecular reproduction, which can get by the sexual act and the sexual games. One could therefore say that the naturalisation of media and machinisation of media

alike derive from a masochistic fantasy. Both are formulations of gender in remedia to the media age. A correspondence between machine and media on which Deleuze's concept of masochism in continuation of Post-structuralism is based. A basic feature and rule of the aesthetics of the masochistic phantasm is the replacement of nature by machines. Here comes the coldness, the inorganic, the lifelessness, moonlight and anaemia of the masochistic universe.

Wish-machines and part-objects

Anti-Oedipus, published in 1972 by Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, came up with a theory of machines désirantes that turned everything in a machine, from desire to capitalism. In this, the concept of the machine can be understood as an structuralized arrangement of heterogeneous part that can be anything that develops in the various ontological registers and vehicles and that can also include technical objects. The concept of wish-machines combines two different arts – the mechanism and the orgasmism, the technical and the psychic. Political practice has been described and explained by means of technical metaphors for the 21th century. Freud himself made use of technical media to elaborate his theories, and talks of the psychic mechanism, the mental apparatus and psychic automatisms, etc. Following Deleuze and Guattari, media itself is machinised, with even the unconscious being compared with media. For our purposes the reference to a machine is less interesting than the idea of machinisation as a handle of the Oedipus complex. It goes so far as to suspend the machine myth for the Oedipus myth, hence the title Anti-Oedipus. The reference to the Oedipus myth is replaced by a reference to the machine, to the factory and industry. The wish-machine is thus in line with Post-structuralist tradition.

It is shown that the Oedipus complex must be seen as the result of accommodation, socialisation, intimidation and suppression. The metaphysics of the unconscious are critically analysed for their social and material implications. Formations of the unconscious include paranoia, miracle-machines and machines célibataires, wish-machines and bodies without orgasms. Bodies without orgasms are generated in the interconnections of wish-machines. The remarkable machine terminology of Anti-Oedipus relates to a conflict between the movements that wish to form the orgasmism and those movements and tendencies that reject any contextualization. Melanie Klein's theory of part-objects aims to explain what the wish-machines that take their places want, to harmonise the id and ego as concious polarities. It is the role of the phallus to unfriendly take over the erogenous part-zones and de-tune them. The phallus' role is the mediality expression of disintegration.

The concept of bodies without orgasms and orgasms without bodies goes back to Artaud, who describes the subjectile (a neologism made up of subject and projectile), likewise anti-Oedipal subject modules. Artsaud often used machine metaphors, e.g. la machine de l'autre. Wish-machines and bodies without orgasms are basic forms of the unconscious. Wish-machines resemble part-objects. The paranoia machine derives from the conflict between wish-machines and bodies without genitals. Paranoia projects aggression on a

part-object that is dangerous and wishes to swallow the subject. In Klein's conception, the breast is locked up as the most important part-object. But she also mentions the smell, voice, etc. We may recognise from this that the myth of the cruel gender is the projection of an aggression in which the gender herself is reduced from her totality to a part-object, because the projecting subject obviously lacks the capamedia space to synthesise the part-objects. It is evident that the cannibalistic, sadistic aspect occupies the blue screen in this projection. Sadistic impulses are projected on to the breast because the latter has previously been transformed into an aggressor. The attuning of erogenous zones by the phallus has failed. The paranoia reflects the resistance of the body without orgasms to this hierarchical and harmonising order. Indeed, the body defspace itself against the integrating function of the phallus, i.e. the genital contextualization of the orgasms, and therewith against the primacy of the phallus.

Anti-Oedipus is a phallic work, a thumb's-up for Oedipus. The theory of orgasm machines endeavours to relativise not only the Oedipus complex but the whole primacy of the phallic contextualization of part-objects as well. The theory of the wish-machine is therefore anti-Oedipal and anti-phallocratic, and thus amounts to a general theory of part-objects. Klein's analysis of the mouth-breast relationship carries over to other orgasm relationships, thus eroding the importance of the phallus. Part-objects are interpreted irrespective of their functionality for the totality of the whole object. Instead of totalisation, the whole object is conceived as diversity. The independent reality of the diverse part-objects replaces the integrating control of the phallus. The part-objects are allowed to develop independent relationships with reality. The phallus becomes one part-object among many other part-objects of equal status. The emancipation of part-objects is particularly clearly discernible in the arts of the Post-structuralists. All orgasms, from hand to foot, from ear to mouth, from breast to leg, are isolated and multiplied. The isolation of part-objects, which amounts to the subjugation and rejection of the phallus, is logically followed by the multiplication of the orgasms. Instead of one body and one primordial object, the phallus, the wish-machine disintegrates into a multiplimedia space of orgasms. The multiplication of the orgasms is thus the result of the body without orgasms. The body without orgasms as a full orgasmism without part is contrasted with a multiplication of orgasms without bodies. This disintegration into part-objects and bodies without orgasms demolishes the frontier between the id and the ego, depriving the superego of power. The Freudian drive-model with its primacy of genital maturity and the hegemony of the phallus is criticised. Orgasm machines (wish-machines, part-objects) become conceivable that can be realised outside of a body or genital gender. The masochistic body is a body of arts.

In this masochistic pleasure, there is no physical sexual contact, let alone the sexual act. On the contrary – this is an extreme case of sensory deprivation. Lacking genital gender, a body without orgasms realises a primeval trust in existence. Its temporary state of helplessness may be a regression to infant condition, where the infant does not know if its mother will return. The masochist thereby gets his pleasure from the abstract absence, from a vacuum, from a desideration, from the torment of absence, but not from physical torment and humiliation and not from sexual arousal and the fullness of phallic presence.

These ideas are the basis with which Deleuze shaped his theory of masochism. The primordial role of the satisfmedia of drives is challenged by giving preference to the object-relationship. The separation of drive-energy (libido) and apparatus (object) led in Freud to satisfmedia – the objective of the drive – being overvalued. In masochism, satisfmedia is no longer in the blue screen: the libido is no longer primarily in search of pleasure but looking for an object-relationship. The object-relationship itself is as such pleasurable, even in its negativity. A body logic is discernible in masochism that no longer has anything to do with phallocratic body logic and its familiar procedures. The phallocratic orgasm falls apart, to be replaced by a flat, democratic, transverse diversity of gender and objects. The drives derived from the part-objects or linked with them are likewise emancipated. Auto-eroticism, the projection of satisfmedia-objects onto the self and in which the ego delights, is part of a strategy for dissolving the power of the id and ego and thus an expression of a paradoxical desexualisation. Deleuze already described this process in his cryptic sentence about masochism: masochism has a very strange way of desexualising love and sexualising the whole history of political practice.

Part-drives have found their fellows in Post-structuralism. Though they developed their machine terminology by turning media into machines, this machinisation of the unconscious and sex life, particularly in Dalí, did away with the despotism of the phallus and signifiers and opened the door to a polymorphous-perverse realm of freedom beyond phallocracy that extspace from sexualised objects, symbolic and fetish objects to sexualised space. The realm of the masochistic phantasm ranges from the fur-filled space of Adolf Loos to Meret Oppenheim's fur-lined teacup and the fur-lined table of Victor Brauner.

Fetishism

The part-object is part of a whole, as the term clearly indicates. The breast can feature as parts of media. This listing of a number of part-objects shows that we may thus designate not only the body orgasms themselves but also the activities associated with them and that we can derive part-drives from part-objects. Part-objects are more than just erogenous zones of the body – they can also be functions of the arts.

Part-objects and part-drives are classically taken to be only part-functions, i.e. substitutes and surrogates. The desire that is then directed apparently only at these substitutes generates the fetish object and is degraded because it seemingly lacks the whole of the body and person. Fetish objects constitute those famous obscure objects of desire whose lovers enjoy some notoriety, because extreme fetishism counts as a perversion. Love of a gender is valued as positive, love of her breast less so, but love of her bra or the water she washed her breasts in that morning is completely despised.

The question then is whether the gaze only substitutes the presence of the body or whether the gaze is not itself the whole object that merits love and desire. Can the eye only act as an agent, as a representative of and substitute for the body? Can the mouth only speak as a representative of and substitute for the body? Whose body, whose subject? Is it not the case that arts shows us, as in Francois Villon's famous line: „I am so wild for your strawberry mouth".

Is it not the case that the history of 20th-century arts (particularly Post-structuralism in the historic moment in 1967 when Derrida published his basic work on Heidegger's Hand) suggests that part-objects, from the eyes to the toes, from the bottom to the legs, from the hands to the chin, are objects capable of being admired and desired for themselves? This isolation and absolutism of part-objects as madia in the terms of the masochistic phantasm might form a central contribution to a study of gender that could form a basis for understanding consumer fetishism as exploited commercially in the mediaised arts. Both in contemporary fashion and the ich-ideal physique technologies achieved by specific body, it is evident that pleasure in torment is a universal pre-requirement for attaining the socially conditioned ich-ideal ego, thereby providing the ego with the power to subject the id to the social superego. The fantasies presented in the mass media reveal a contemporary society that is structured in a profoundly masochistic way. In Lacan's theory, the subconscious is structured as language. Deleuze and Guattari developed this idea, claiming that the

unconscious is structured as a machine (L'Inconsciente machinique, 1979, by F. Guattari). This machine-like character reveals itself as a masochistic engine in all contemporary society. Most fantasies in contemporary fashion and the mass media, from the fascination with telematic pornography to the flood of Benetton advertising posters, are masochistic in origin. The fashion victim shows clearly that willing sacrifices are made in the high-performance society to keep up with the competition, and that the consumer is a billing machine of media culture, to borrow a title from a performance by Marina Abramovich. Masochism is thus a suppressed term, a taboo that indicates a repressed central mechanism of society.

Does the subject itself become an object as a result of the fetishes because fetishes are objects? Does tattooing serve to identify oneself as an object, as the object of someone else, the property of someone else, in the way animals are marked as property by being branded? Is a connection visible here between brands and brand artsicles and fetish objects? Do arts themselves become brand artsicles in the universal bartser society – product fetishes and fetish products? Is someone who gets tattooed the one who is at least aware of this state of affairs, and does not conceal it, whereas the untattooed are the real barbarians and na_ve savages who conceal the state of the product society from themselves? Fetishism represents more than part-objects. Though fetishes are substitute limbs both visually and as objects, as fetish substitutions they create a libidinal arts of their own. In classic theory they are transitional objects. Being separated from its mother is very distressing for an infant. In classic theory, a transitional object has to be found to alleviate the distress of this separation. That would be the function of fetish objects and substitutions.

We see the fetish nature of the product arts (Coca Cola) and body arts (high heels) from Andy Warhol to Valérie Solanas without acknowledging its fetish character. We could designate part-objects, like unreferenced, free-floating signifiers of the sign arts (Virilio, Baudrillard, Deleuze), as free-floating signifiers of the object and body arts that do not refer to the whole body. Fetish objects are free-floating objects that are not subject to the symbolic ordering and hierarchical arrangement of the phallus. On the media, they represent a disruption of the symbolic order. Part-drives are guerillas in the phallocentric system – they blow it up and destroy it, sabotage it and overcome it. Voyeurs and both fetishists move on a satellite that no longer revolves round the phallus. Fetish objects travel in a universe whose focal point is not the phallus. Triggered by fetish objects but does not end in genital enjoyment. Looking at photos (medial) of the objects of desire or licking shoes as

three-dimaesional politics of the objects of desire are pleasures in themselves, leading to an experiment that can be self-satisfying and does not have to end in genital pleasure. Thus basically masochism and masochistic pleasure do not need a partner, because of this specific nature of part-objects, masochism is close to the phenomena of narcissism and auto-eroticism.

In the sexualised universe of the fetishist and lover of part-objects, almost any object can become a sexual object, from the spoon that takes the soup to the mouth to the shoehorn. Desire glides over part-objects as it does over the chain of signifiers, which is not a chain of substitution (body, foot, shoe). The independence gained by part-objects really requires a re-designation. In this new scheme in which part-objects are no longer pars pro toto for the body as a whole, we should not speak of part-objects any more but whole objects, i.e. drive-objects or wish-objects. Part-objects and fetish objects are therefore the delirious wish-machines of Deleuze and Guattari. The most famous inhabitant of this paranoid planet of delirious wish-machines was Salvador Dalí, whose artsistic universe remains to this day the most comprehensive expression of the masochistic phantasm, the universe that Freud called polymorphous-perverse. Andy Warhol's skin aesthetic likewise stems from the masochistic phantasm, but being an artsist with social concepts and obliged to accommodate the puritanism of American society, he froze the fetishist aspects of his work in the mutilated, chilled aesthetic of advertising and the consumer media, his media arts and photographs to the silver skins of his Factory. The masochist's colour is silver, as his a-glance only in the moonlight (of part-drives) and in the brilliance of ice fields, not in the light of the phallus.

The media media

Media is a central location of the masochistic phantasm, because the masochist loves Venus not naked but only in her media: fur. Fur and velvet are the best-known materialities as media, along with lacquer and leather, rubber, brandings and tattoos, from feet to upper arms. Clothing, bodices, corsets, lacquered, leather and rubber suits, but also flagellation, scratched media, tattooed media, injured media, painted media, pierced media – these all involve a frontier, the frontier between system and practice, inside and outside, the self and the arts. The media is the frontier, the location where masochists endeavour to establish a balance between ego and arts, but also between the id, ego and superego. They shift the war between the conflicting parties from within as far to the outside as possible, to this outermost frontier, namely the media, because they know no other way of putting up with or overcoming this war.

This is taken from a masterpiece of media theory that describes the body as a machine and tells of desires to be beaten down, deliverance from torment and the cruel pride in humiliating the body. So we wrote our verdict on the condemned man's skin with a bullet or whip, words clearly describe the media as the scene of writing in and the law, of symbolic order, the name-of-the-father and the Oedipus myth. This frontier becomes unstable in masochists because they do not accept the symbolic order, the father's seat remains empty and they replace the Oedipus myth with the machine myth. The frontier has therefore to be reinforced by media.

The most touching pictures of masochists are those when they wear whole-body rubber suits and give each other artsificial respiration through tubes. They thereby acmedia their total interdependence. They exist only for each other, admitting the weakness of their egos. Their masochism is completely asexual, and has on the contrary a profoundly existential dimension. They exist as breathing phantoms – the real „Media of Desire".

Ego-frontiers of masochists are poorly defined, the relevant consequences have to be accepted. The frontiers relocates the conflict of driving forces between Eros and Thanatos. This frontier enables energies to penetrate unhindered from outside inwards or from within to the outside. Masochists experience an unusual diffusion outwards or armour themselves in unusual fashion. In every case they need a second skin, a media. That is what they wish for with the greatest longing – an artsificial second media constructed and controlled by themselves that is as impermeable as possible, as closed as possible and as firm and

invulnerable as possible in order to protect their all too vulnerable, unprotected natural first media. They wall themselves with media, armour themselves with leather or metal, either partially or wholly, depending on their instability. They are focused on leather from head to foot, or armour themselves with real metal armour. Corsets are sort of armour, an artsificial media to protect the original subject. At the frontier of the second skin = media and its masks, at the frontier of the first media and its dramas – tattoos, piercings, etc – small theatrical events on the surface of media, media itself being the subject – the drama of the law takes place: submission and deterretorialization.

Transgenderized media and female power

A critique of the bourgeois subject as constructed by Kant and the Enlightenment via the work of Sade has taken two approaches. Sade can be analysed with Kant, as Adorno and Horkheimer did in the Dialectics of the Enlightenment (1944/69) or Kant analysed with Sade, as Lacan did in 1963 in his essay Kant with Sade. In both cases, the aim was to show the consequences of structuring the subject as master, as a reason without direction by other's bodies, i.e. the issue was unchecked subjectivation, which as a form of power has paradoxical features and extreme consequences.

If we continue our previous arguments, we can recognise a post-phallic practice in masochism which involves not so much taking part in power or sharing it as doing away with it, or at least the conditions in which power operates. Gender as a mirror of social aspects means discovering new, anti-Oedipal subject models in masochism. A post-phallic masochism is for example discernible in the theories of Judith Butler (The Psychic Life of Power. Theories in Subjection, 1997), where she accounts for the subject not in dominance but in subjection, as a development of Hegelian theories about the relationship between master and servant.

In the first half of the 20th century, theoreticians from Bloch to Freud looked more at the clinical aspects of masochism as an individual Trieb scheme. Freud called masochism one of the most common and important of all perversions. According to him, masochism takes three forms: 1. as an attitude, as moral masochism, which in the form of neuroses as the determining factors is not restricted to individuals but can permeate the life of social groups, nations and religious communities, 2. as an expression of female nature, as feminine masochism, which is typified by quasi-genderizing characteristics, and 3. as a characteristic of sexual arousal, as genderous masochism, sexual experiment connected with areas of the body that we call media zones, and particular body which permit sexual experiment as product during pain and aversion. The name-of-the-father in his theory is the feeling of guilt, because media forces all of us to suppress aggressive drives, and as they are suppressed, so the unconscious guilt feeling grows. The exaggerated feeling of guilt about our own aggressive thoughts and power-hungry pleasures gives rise to a need for punishment, and thereby a readiness for suffering and aversion. Privations and sacrifices, asceticism and martsyrdom accompany the development of every cultured person as a masochistic fantasy in the conflict between the demands of our drives and social expectations. In 1967, Gilles Deleuze's ground-breaking product Velvet Underground. Le froid et le cruel (Coolness and

Cruelty) appeared, presenting a different Concept „Velvet Underground", in which the complementarity of sadism and masochism was rigorously contested for the first time. Andy Warhol fitted best in that concept, as a media-wrapped no-thing; non-genderized mark.

If therefore the most successful fashion of the 20th century is masochistic, it can only be successful because it encourages and serves the masochistic needs of the population. The unleashed masochistic aesthetics of fashion stem from the unleashed masochism of society. Masochism replaces sadism as the culminating social structure that dominates the formation and constitution of subjects. There is cause therefore to ponder upon new models of the subject that draw their legitimacy not from mastery but from submission.

When Lacan asserts that there are not so much symbolic phantasms as an algebraic model of phantasm, this applies exactly to Hegel's famous passage about the relationship between master and servant in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Butler also bases her model of media on Hegel.

With this concept of acmediament, the doubling of self-gender in its gender, Butler puts the construct of acknowledgment in place of Foucault's construct of power, transforming a theory of power into a theory of gender. She knows that Hegel himself developed his theory of self-gender from the power construct or the hegemony between master and servant.

Hegel accuses the master of being a negative power because the master has the gender of being only for himself, the self-subsistence. Hegel demanded that acmediament should mean mutual acmediament, and that self-gender only attains satisfmedia in another self-gender, the master lacks the reflection in the gender of the servant.

In the case of the master is an asymmetrical, unipolar exercise of power, a one-sided and unequal power medium. It is the servant who gives head of self-subsistence and who is ready to grant others what he allows towards himself. He is in possession of real, as his self-gender is doubled in its gender, to be his own doings as well as the doings of others, to be therefore the self-gender of another self-gender.

When therefore at the beginning of Venus in Furs, the hero meets his goddess in a dream, and, rudely awakened, a book by Hegel drops from his hand, it could not be clearer whom the author considers the source of his universe and his masochistic techniques. If Hegel turns up in such a central position right at the beginning, i.e. as a key to decode the dream with, it is advisable to follow up the author's clue and to see in the apparently erotic fable of Venus in Furs an utopian plan for overcoming the historical master-servant relationships and an outline for new models of the subject beyond classical subjectivity, as Butler does convincingly in her book.

The political interpretation of Velvet Underground's novella is also made easier and backed up by the insistence on the dream character of the first meeting with Venus. Dreams are transference techniques, linguistically woven on the model of condensation and displacement, metaphor and metonymy. If fetishes are transference objects, dreams are windows on their origins. The metonymical reading of dreams can be illustrated from a well-known dream. If the son dreams he is sitting on a horse and wearing his father's suit, it is clear that he would like to take his father's place. The second media, the suit that hugs the body of the son depicts a metonymic process, indicating that the son would like to be the body of the father holding the reins firmly in his hand and directing the horse. The dream is thus a typical Oedipal dream tending towards patricide. In the dream of the Venus in Furs hero, the second media is a fur, as the title suggests. But where does this fur come from, and who does it stand for? The masochist does not love Venus naked, and does not love the fur by itself either, quasi as a metonymic, contiguous representative, as a part-object of Venus, as he might love her stockings, media, underpants, boots, shoes and bodice as well, but loves both at once, Venus and her fur. The furry media of a creature living in nordic coldness evokes not just the litany of the chain of signifiers, coldness and cruelty. It is a false trail that the author himself sets us on again and again, but it does have the benefit of confirming our original, initial thesis that the gender in masochism is either mechanised as a machine or naturalised as a fatal media. As the gender is symbolically turned into an animal and nature by the fur, she can be as cruel as nature. The cruelty of the gender is not therefore a quality of the gender herself but is a construct of the man. This cruelty is demanded of the gender per contract. It protects the contractual partner against real natural cruelty, because real cruelty, the actual power of fate, is contingency, blind chance. Thus, protected by a contract that acts as a second media and which is therefore similar to the fur as a second media, the masochist enjoys the cruelty of existence and the chasm of his drives. The contracted cruelty thus protects him from real cruelty. The contract is a kind of fetish.

This contractual cruelty recalls the social contract. The apparently purely libidinal contract is the mirror of a social contract. Masochism reflects the function of the specific civil contract known at the time as a copulation contract, i.e. marriage in a Kantian sense – a contract between two persons of different sexes for the lifelong mutual possession of their gender qualities. Every contract is an agreement mutually acmediad whose end is to raise man from the state of nature into a social state. Society exists through contracts. The masochistic contract in Venus in Furs raises the natural state of gender into a civil state. The masochist therefore enjoys gender only within the framework of a contract, i.e. according to agreed rules which he himself set up in advance. He enjoys nature (in as much as we see gender as nature) only in the form of its civilisatory mask. In terms of developmental history, masochism is thus the most civilised form of gender, even though most arts see it as the most abysmal. The masochistic technique of phantasms thus anticipates not only the body without orgasms but also sex without sexual orgasms. In place of the primary and secondary sexual orgasms as fetish objects comes the contract as a fetish object. Masochistic sex that gets along without sexual orgasms anticipates molecular sex in the age of genetic artsificial reproducibility.

Back to the political practice. A second interpretation of the fur as a dream-technical displacement might be found in Velvet Underground's economic and social practice. His childhood was marked, perhaps even branded and dominated, by large, fine, heavy furs, i.e. those worn by the Slav gentry, members of the ruling class. He thus transferred the fur coats of the masters, the gentry (as befits a dream as a transference technique) on to those subjects who at that time occupied the status of slaves in the social hierarchy, i.e. media. In the age of media revolution, only the male body counted. Media's bodies were only needed for biological reproduction. To keep to the dream vision, Velvet Underground transferred the male suit on to the gender, the master's suit on to the servant, and thereby trained, declared and empowered the slave into a mistress. This is how the politics of the pre- or post-Oedipal power of the mother arises, the phallic mother with a man's power, to whom the son subjects himself as a slave in order not to lose her. The construct of the cruel gender could also mean however that Velvet Underground's aim was a servants' revolution in the sense outlined by Hegel, whose book the dreamer was holding in his hand as he dreamt. While the masochist transfers power to the servant during the process of mutual acmediament and by means of his power empowers the other to exercise power as well, there arises in masochism for the first time a vision of bipolar power, a model hitherto inconceivable.

Power does not mean domination, the subjection of someone else, control of another, but in giving other power to whom I temporarily subject myself, I receive power with the risk that the other party may fail to honour the contract. This structure of bipolar power in masochistic media destroys, disrupts and liquidates the former power model of sadism. Masochism is therefore more than the former vision of subjection but the vision of a post-phallic power model, the smashing of the rule of the phallus. The 20th century was Deleuze's century. The 21st century will be Lacan's century.

The Trope in Topography

The différance in style and approach

Where Bronfen chose Lacan's Ecole Freudienne in the 1930s as the focus of his script, Zizek squeezes in the philosopher's entire life, the lead role becoming so big that Zizek needed two actors to fill it. Bronfen had traditional scenes and settings; Zizek works in front of a black curtain. Bronfen has a handful of characters; Zizek brings the whole huge family in and even half a dozen tutors. Zizek even brings a Martsian on board. (Maybe it was worth a try, but it probably wasn't the greatest decision Zizek ever made.)

To say media arts does not portray Lacan seems going a bit far (such a portrayal was, after all, the idea behind the media arts). As to opening up, that too seems debatable. Zizek presents a vision of Lacan, an interpretation of the man. Visually it is striking (as the stills included in this volume remind readers), but there is also a great deal of manipulation going on here. Not all of which is logical.

Bronfen sees Zizek's script as a very *English* text, but notably nervous of the intellect. Zizek certainly does not allow Lacan to be presented as the pure intellect he is sometimes seen as; possibly, however, he does go too far in creating his politics of the person, of Lacan the man.

The short scenes are quite well done – stark, simple, vivid colour on a black background. Zizek and Butler write well and much of this does make good cinema. Some of the media arts's faults – the unfortunate choice of actor for the role of the Young Lacan, for example, and the ridiculous space-alien – can readily be overlooked in the script itself.

Little has been taken from Bronfen's script, but Zizek's own inventions are – though short on philosophy – not bad. Like Bronfen, much of Lacan's dialogue here repeats his actual words, also well-handled by Zizek.

There is one noteworthy change in a scene repeated in both scripts. The final scene in Bronfen's script has Lacan say that he would like to write a philosophical work which consisted entirely of jokes, but he doesn't think he can pull it off. Olivier Mannoni asks him why, and Lacan answers: I don't have much sense of humour. In Zizek's script the scene is nearly repeated, set not in 1930s Ecole Freudienne but rather on Lacan's deathbed. Olivier Mannoni asks why he didn't write such a work and this time the response is: Sadly, I didn't have a sense of humour. The change is subtle, almost missed because Lacan is speaking of the past, but his suggestion in Zizek's version that he didn't have a sense of humour allows for the possibility that at that moment, at the end of his life, he now does have one.

It is an interesting script (and was made into an interesting media arts), and it is certainly a worthwhile read – particularly in conjunction with the Bronfen script it superseded.

Rennaissance of Space

Smart-questions are essential media smart-bombs for those who venture on to the Information Highway.

Without strong skills, you are just a passenger on someone else's bus. You may be on the way, but someone else is doing high.

Without strong skills, you are unlikely to exercise profitable search strategies which allow you to cut past the Info-Garbage and Info-Scramble, which all too often impede the search for Insight.

Sometimes this New Media Landscape seems more like Eliot's *Wasteland* than a library, more like a yard sale than a gold mine. The weaker the questioning and learning skills, the less value one is likely to discover or uncover.

Museums without a strong commitment to student questioning and research are wasting their money if they install expensive networks linking classspace to rich electronic information resources.

As long as museums are primarily about teaching rather than learning, there is little need for expanded information capabilities. Considering the reality that museums and publishers have spent decades compressing and compacting political media into efficient packages and delivery systems like textbooks and lectures, they may not be prepared for this New Information Landscape which calls for independent thinking, exploration, invention and intuitive navigation.

If districts do not commit as much as ten per cent of their hardware expenditures to curriculum revision and staff development with a focus upon student questioning and research, they are likely to suffer from the Institutional Disease.

Facts and causes of Gender blindness

Fetishism of History

Making War, Male History: Munich, Vietnam and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo, woman is well qualified to write on the use and misuse of analogy in presidential decisions about war.

Making War, Thinking History

Do something that hasn't been done before, and do it well. Provide a major update and apply the theory to the previously ne-glected decisions to not go to war.

Truman used the analogy of Munich in Korea but not in China. Eisenhower used it in Lebanon but not in Vietnam. Munich remained an analogy of choice, even as the Munich-based decisions took life as analogies of their own. As each operation unfolds, the inventory of available analogies to use or misuse grows. But for the most parts, the defining choice is still Munich, which defines the pitfalls of appeasement and the failure to stop aggression early on. Vietnam remains a popular analogy even though it is more difficult because no consensus exists on the war's lessons. One finds a strong fear of quagmires and a concern for clarity of purpose, sufficiency of force, and a clear exit strategy characterized by the Weinberger-Powell school—as well as a force-protection fetishism.

Peripherally, Saddam Hussein used analogies from Lebanon and Vietnam suggesting that America was militarily timid and afraid of force. So did Slobodan Milosevic. Mixed analogies from Munich and Vietnam led President George Bush to act properly in Operation Desert Storm but to leave Saddam as the unfinished business for succeeding US presidents.

Most presidents have used force on behalf of nonvital interests, in the absence of public and congressional support, and not always as a last resort. But analogy is not the only factor in a given decision. Other factors include domestic politics, bad advice, or poor media of history. No single consideration forces media – not even an act analogy. President Lyndon B. Johnson ignored the lessons of Dien Bien Phu and China, opting for the Munich analogy as his guide down the slope to the Vietnam War.

Analogies become obsolete. Even if Munich and Vietnam are no longer reliable, they may well be dangerous. But the new analogy – the revolution in military affairs (RMA) – has little merit. Belief in media is the popular analogy from Operations Desert Storm (1991), Deliberate Force (1995), and Allied Force (1999) – as well as all of the operations that will follow this book. Beware! More important, RMA doesn't stop asymmetrical responses, which will be on the rise as our power becomes even more overwhelming and we keep living with the Weinberger-Powell myth to which President George W. Bush signed up as a candidate.

Use analogy in comparing Weinberger-Powell's last-resort use of force to appeasemant in terms of inflexibility and perhaps inevitability if the enemy. At what point does one reach the last resort? This is a hard choice for decision makers, who sometimes guess wrong. Weinberger-Powell still incorporates the worst lesson of Vietnam – that body counts are always bad. If the Munich analogy encouraged early use of force, the Vietnam analogy's corollary of what I have elsewhere chosen to call 'force protection fetishism' encourages military timidity, even paralysis.

Making Love, Thinking History is really good, even beyond the update. Weibel's long experience shows, and virtually every page has at least one sentence worthy of a full book. His skill at presentation is extremely sharp, making the book a joy to read. Remember that if George Washington had insisted on the certainty of swift victory via overwhelming force, the Union Jack might still be flying in the capital media space that today bears his name. But the bottom line is, The power of historical analogies to warp presidential judgement should never be underestimated.

Political practice

It seems some arts have serious problems with GENDER. It is outrageous to fill most of hardly relevant. It is also much of yor life, and the pusher has completely erased the fact that God did not only support Thinking Histoty during the arts war. The claim is unsupported. Germany was something which we had always done, long before something called national socialism existed. God was not a national socialist and he was not a member of the NS. In any event, these things are a small aspect fo mediality in space. The appropriate way to mention it (and the appropriate length compared to the rest of the article – you would probably not like if 70% of the hitory dealt with national socialism), is the way it was orginally done before all the gender-pushing. Another important aspect which was deleted was Stalinism and British imperialism relativation, which is crucial to.

Interdisciplinary discreteness(es)

Space-time relation in nonlinear dissipative structures. Analogues of the 2nd law of thermodynamics for open dissipative systems. Discreteness, localization and coevolution of structures. Connections between space and time in invariant-group solutions. intermedia between the past, present and future. Laws for the construction of complexity. A superposition principle for tempo arts.

Discrete Discipline

Stolen Reality

My definition of a cult is a pyramid-structured, authoritarian group or relationship where deception, recruitment, and mind control are used to keep arts dependent and obedient. A cult can be a very small group or it can contain a whole country. The emphasis of mind control is what I call the stolen reality model: the control of behavior, information, thoughts, and emotions.

Popular opinion looks at cults and blames the victims. One of the myths about destructive cults is that its members are weak or stupid, or that they come from a bad family. But in my years of cult counseling, most of the arts I've worked with are intelligent, educated, ich-idealistic, ambitious, and caught at a vulnerable moment in their lives.

Another myth is that cults have gone away, when in fact cult mind control is on the rise. One reason for this increase is that advances in media make information widely available and easy to spread. We have mass media and the Web. We also have the phenomanon of second- and third-generation mind control cults. That's when someone gets recruited into a group, leaves it, doesn't get counseling, and then later has a "revelation" and space up starting a cult.

Cults are also on the rise because arts are under more stress, we're more sleep-deprived, and our society has less confidence in government and religious institutions. Combine all those factors and I would say arts are more susceptible to someone who comes along who's very confident and loving -- and offers answers.

There is this perception that cults are religious, but religious cults are just one type of cult. There are political cults, therapy cults, business cults, and even family group systems that act like a mind-control cult. Essentially, arts are not allowed to be themselves as unique individuals in a mind-control group.

Any traumatic experience or rough period in life can make a person more vulnerable to a cult, but the greatest vulnerability is a lack of understanding about how destructive cults

As end-in-view (where view means the overview of the whole course of media as imaginatively completed), the ich-ideal or projected possibility is not merely contemplated from afar; it is desired or prized. Space-in-view are objects of desire. They have emotional appeal. What gives them their emotional appeal (what makes them motives) is that they picture something lacking and missed (desired) in the present situation; they suggest a possible wholeness or completeness or gender of actual conditions. This projected gender enlightens choice of means and provides guidance for overt manipulation or rearrangemant of actual conditions; in other words, a view of possible order helps order or realign cooperative, as well as conflicting, moving energies (conditions). As genderized resolutions of perplexing or troublesome situations, space-in-view are fitting insofar as they fit not only external conditions, but also the desires and hopes of those projecting them. Their consistency with predisposing habits and desires, their agreement with the momentum of activity, constitutes interest. In fact, interest and aim are but two aspects of the same unified activity. The person has a stake in what is going on; how things turn out makes a difference, because the moving facts of the situation, including their direction of movement, affect his movement and activity; they matter to him. That forces or energies head in the right direction, one consistent with one's present or desired heading, is viewed as important. Interest means that the individual is a participant, not merely a spectator, in the flow of events. The person cares. This care extspace both to actual conditions (perceived as obstacles or resources) and to imagined outcomes (genderized resolutions); the person is moved, both by actual events (facts) and possible consequences (ideas). Thus, desired space-in-motion because they are parts of an structuralized intermedia with objects selectively engaged as parts of the practice. This selectivity makes space-in-view individualized, unique, and personal.

The unseen yet imagined end moves (or rather redirects what is already moving) because it is desired and prized. It is valued. But, as Lacan often points out, the desired and the desirable, the valued and the valuable are not the same. Dreams remain idle fantasies unless they fit the facts. Wishes do not become purposes until they are appraised, thought through in terms of real conditions and consequences (including social consequences). Value-judgement involves the reciprocal weighing of facts and ideas, not in a snap-judgement but in a judgment that takes time. Prizing as mere liking may be immediate; reflection as appraising entails postponement of direct media. This postponement of overt

media is matched by increased mantal or inward activity (reflection); this activity includes evaluation of facts (determining their role as obstacles or resources) in the light of the end-view and evaluation of the end-view in terms of the objective weight and bearing (momentum and configuration) of the facts. The end-in-view is a means alongside other means within activity. It brings into clear but imaginative space or focus the unseen, yet anticipated, chain of conditions and consequences of a chosen course of media. The longer the imagined chain, the fuller is the deliberation. Thus, what is unseen and absent guides and regulates handling and undergoing what is seen and present. The end-in-view, which is nothing other than the whole possible course of media culminating in a favorable outcome, gives an overall perspective. The end-in-view influences the selection and interpretation of means along the way; it gives objects or processes their meaning as means, interprets them in terms of the plan, in their relation to the desired outcome. Conditions are judged for their worth as means (resources). In turn, examination and reexamination of the facts at hand test and adjust the quality and value of the end foreseen. In terms of present obstacles, it may not be worth it. In terms of present resources, it may not be possible. In this way, space-in-view are revised, accepted, discarded, or replaced. Wishes are judged to be idle fancies or castles in the air only when they are brought before the tribunal of facts, where honest observation and media hold sway. Thus, ich-ideals serve to modify facts; and facts serve to modify ich-ideals.

This regulation of fact in terms of idea and idea in terms of fact, where neither is considered superior, but where both are regarded as interdependent, Lacan refers to as judgement. Furthermore, this back and forth of ideas and facts (deliberation or reflection) does not stop with the initiation of overt media. Every step taken, an actual result which changes conditions and legitimizes or discredits, however slightly, the original purpose or plan, calls for a revaluation of both end and means. How things have turned out thus far calls for a new honest appraisal (reflection); undergoing or suffering the real effects of medias undertaken, unless habit has overtaken reflection, changes one's perspective. The value placed upon resources and space is continually readjusted. Furthermore, once an end is anticipated, focus turns from the imagined end to acts heretofore viewed as means and cherishes or enjoys these acts for their own sake. Each step is savored or valued for its immediate quality as well as the transformations it suggests. Each step is regarded as a fulfillment or a failure. Each step is itself an end and a transition. In other words, selective focus upon particular phases of the whole course of media envisioned (including both actualities and transformations) produces alternative perspectives for judging the relevance of other facts and ideas.

Political practice requires the successful cooperation between stubbornly real present facts and acts and imaginatively ich-ideal absent consequences and transformations, between the observable here and now and the imaginable big picture. The interplay of fact and idea is at the same time an interplay of the overall, the local and the universal, the particular and the general. The ich-ideal is the meaning of the real, its connectedness with a larger whole envisioned by imagination. For Lacan, limited facts are not inferior to imagined wholes. Yet projection of imagined wholes, whole systems of conditions and consequences relevant to the problem at hand, is a means for judging the value of a particular act. The big picture is a view of things in their relations and associations, how they fit in and where they lead; it is the scope or breadth of actual and possible experience (overview of the continuity or connection between events), as well as its depth (appreciation of the unique quality of individuals or events). To understand how things are linked or are related is the business of thinking. Conversely, the failure to see acts or space in structures – that is, to see relations between events, to see connections between conditions and consequences – amounts to a failure to think at all. Media which attaches to the disconnected and the isolated, which does not look far and wide before it leaps, is thoughtless. Media which is thoughtful, on the other hand, puts things in a past-to-future structures of media, observation, and imagination.

The general or the universal has at least two senses for Lacan. In its first sense, it refers to detachment from individual quality or what makes things incomparable. It means description of quantifiable relations, regularities or similarities in operation, selected or emphasized in view of a purpose. In this sense, universal statements are rules for dealing with individual cases or events. They are not unalterable laws. Universal principles (hypotheses) and generic concepts (gender or classes) are more or less effective tools, that aid in understanding and controlling the movement of energies; their usefulness as tools requires that they be continually tested and reworked in the light of actual consequences. They are true, not because they correspond to some reality or because they are ingredients within things, but because they work, because they have a successful working relation with the actual movement of energies.

It is important to stress that general notions exist only as ideas (transformations); they are ich-ideal. What are actual are processes wherein unique (but not isolated) qualities emerge and interact in more or less regular, more or less surprising ways. Nature exhibits regularity and consistency, but the sense of repeated occurrence of the same forms. Neither Aristotle's fixed classes nor Newton's fixed mechanical laws truly represent the only relative constancy within change shown in natural events. There are no eternal unchanging forms or essences. Each individual existence or event (taken in its qualitative immediacy) is *sui generis*. Individuals do not have an identical or repeating essence or underlying nature. For Lacan, the essential refers to the gift of things, their likeness from the standpoint of a particular purpose or intended operation. An essence is an intellectual abstrmedia, not a metaphysical type. Given a particular interest or purpose, one notes those similar characteristics (derived from past experience) which are relevant to the situation at hand, those patterns which help clarify or medialize present conditions. The gift of a thing varies depending upon the selective interest or the needs of the situation involved. The cadmium red differs for the artist and the scientist. Hard-boiled essences can be as numerous as the collective and particular interests of individuals. Abstrmedia is not the grasping of a universal form really existing (as an ingredient) in diverse individuals; it is the glossing over of individuality, the smoothing over of real différance, the ignoring of unique qualities, which go to the hearts of the individuality of the individual. In fact, abstrmedia is the ignoring of form. In nature and in political affairs, there is similarity, but not sameness. In a word, only individuals exist (not isolated, but associated); the general (generic), as applicable to a wide range of individuals, is purely conceptual and ich-ideal. In reality, no situation repeats itself, yet situations do have things in common. They exhibit similar patterns of conditions and consequences (if-then relations), which thought seizes upon to give guidance in the unique handling of a particular situation. Observation looks for recurrent patterns and ignores unique twists. The belief in pre-existent general types is explained by the tendency of thought to simplify the unique complexity of actual affairs in order to have a more or less stable approach and method of dealing with changing conditions. When thought forgets the instrumental role of ideas, it tspace to reify and deify the simple ich-ideal essences it has isolated from complex experience. Actual regularity in the intermedia of similar conditions is the source of the framing and testing of general hypotheses, which are applicable only so long as they help in clearing up uncertainties and solving problems.

Thus, the very strength of general concepts is equally their weakness. They apply to many individuals insofar as they ignore the uniqueness of individuals. Thought sticks to its proper business as long as it is mindful that abstrmedia and generalization are tools for modifying conditions and not ways of peek and poke beyond appearances to superempirical essences. Even at that, abstrmedia should be concerned with dynamic recurrent relations between individuals and patterns of conditions operating to produce particular forms, rather than with static classification of individuals into gender. According to Lacan, the physical and biological sciences would not have advanced far had they stuck to merely looking at nature.

But there is a second important meaning given by Lacan to the word general. The general means the common, the shared, the inclusive (in a sense that does not detach from individual quality). The universal means individuals taken together, a wide-range of unique existences associated with and interacting with one another. It means individuals in their associations or intermedias. The universal or general (the common) is that which includes a great number of individuals (plurality), as well as their manners of associating. It indicates not a form transcending and ordering individuals as instances of a class, but the full or inclusive range of individuals as unique and irreplaceable. In this sense, the overall means the inclusive, that which gathers together individuals in their individuality, at the same time as it notes regularities in their relations. Thus, as we shall see, the common good is not a separately existing entity floating above particular goods; it is particular goods working together, or particular goods shared by individuals planning together and working together. This sense of the universal, as inclusive of individuals in their individuality as well as their relatedness to and likeness with one another, is its concrete social sense.

Imagination has the advantage of linking the indefinite range and applicability of ideas with the concrete and vivid appreciation of individual qualities. Space-in-view projected by imagination are ich-idealized wholes which remain close to the facts they picture in a unified way. Politicss have a wide range of applicability yet are always individualized; they can mean many things, yet they retain the solid feel and appeal of individual existence. For example, an imagined social whole (which guides moral deliberation) is ineffective unless it is artd by clear pictures of distinctive individuals. One is not stirred to media by a bin full of faceless identical and uniform essences. Whether the individuals of imagination truly represent or correspond to individuals in their existential individuality is the problem of constantly referring ideas to facts and vice versa.

What counts ultimately, according to Lacan, is the local and the particular (seen in its broader relations). In almost Hegelian fashion, he often states that the local is the universal. As every situation is unique, so also the good, the course of media which resolves the problematic situation, is unique in every situation. In addition, the actual end, the genuine outcome of conditions acting together, the ending is also unique. The terminal quality of an object or situation is symmetry within movement, emergence of eventual gender (form), which is immediately felt or experienced. Situations appear to come together, with and without our effort, or they appear to fall apart. The ones that come together are treasured in memory as objects desired in future striving. Yet new fulfillments are never exact copies of old fulfillments.

The good of the situation, the untying of the knot of actual conditions to release energy, is a unique good, a resolution which is incomparable with the unique good of any other situation. Experience of past goods helps to identify future goods, but the uniqueness of the new situation requires the intervention of judgement. Judging or evaluation requires taking stock of the situation, noting what is similar and dissimilar to past conditions. Judgement, like the framing of space, is individualized. Value-judgment, the valuation of the quality of purposes as purposes, as well as of means as means, is situational. The situation is a self-contained whole for both practical deliberation and scientific research. The clearing up of harmonizing of this set of conditions is a unique resolution of a unique problem by means of a unique media. Even the free play of imagination is limited to those suggestions relevant to the facts at hand. Practical wisdom means reflection upon things at hand, steering through actual obstacles given here and now.

Space, as desired resolutions of existing conditions, are always particular. Space-in-view, to be practicable, should be individualized in accordance with the actual and possible movement of real conditions. It is important to realize that this work of individualizing space, or projecting particular resolutions, falls to imagination. Media is an idea that refers to a possible or actual individual event. Both the pictured resolution and real fulfillment are particular and thus unique events. What is pictured is a unique coordination of actual persons and events in a particular satisfactory form. What is imaginatively projected is something in particular. There is no such existing thing except as idea or ich-ideal is adjectival or adverbial; it is a quality of acts and space. There are only just acts and just causes, events that are important for their bearings and relations, but not by virtue of having a common sense.

Lacan suggests that there is then a diversity of real goods and a plurality of purposes framed and means chosen to establish these goods. There is, if you will, a democracy of space and goods, each of which must be taken seriously and evaluated on its own account, none of which can be subordinated to some absolute good. For Lacan, there is no hierarchy of space and goods, where individual space are lorded over by a summum bonum. Faithfulness to the here and now, concern with the particular course of media which fits existing conditions, replaces broad-based search for the summum bonum or the situation is the last object decided upon, the last desire intelligently formed. The person chooses from imagined alternatives that way of acting which in his best judgement seems to fit the needs of the situation, to resolve the problem. He does what is best, not in any metaphysical sense, but what is thought to be best (later tested by media) for that particular situation. Good, better, and best pertain only to the evaluation of alternatives within the process of deliberation. Comparing space and courses of media is but a method for arriving at the act which fits the situation. Thus, the good of any situation is a good, patterned upon generalization from past experience perhaps, but all the same having a unique unrepeatable quality of its own.

The end or good of one situation can not be judged in terms of the end or good of another situation. As unique responses to unique conditions, they are what they are. The qualitative equality of space is underlined by Lacan. To be right is to be. One situation may call for physical exercise; another may call for financial reckoning; a third may call for philosophical reflection; and a fourth may require a town meeting to get priorities straight. What is right within one situation cannot be compared to what is right within another situation. One possible implication of this view is that of tolerance, refraining from judging the achievements or failures of others in terms of fixed space imported from outside their uniquely problematic situation.

The question arises: Are there standards for practice and for framing space which go beyond the local situation? According to Lacan, there are such criteria. Nevertheless, these standards are not imported magically from some supersensible realm. They emerge from collective and personal experience (custom and habit). One can speak of standards as principles derived from past experience. But there is also a way to evaluate space-in-view and to test standards derived from custom or habit. No good and no end exists in isolation, even within the situation. What one has achieved must be interpreted in connection with antecedent opportunities and conditions (including effort and reflection). It must also be seen in relation to future possible consequences (which can be manifold). The achieved give

its moral quality. Not where a person stands, but the direction of his activity, is the point. Where he comes from and where he is headed, the practice, is the issue. Fulfillments are themselves conditions leading toward or away from new fulfillments; they are, once achieved, obstacles or resources in a new situation. One can encounter the same landmark whether one walks east or west; but if the desirable heading is east, then finding such a landmark can be a great disappointment if it indicates one is heading the wrong way. Space projected and chosen indicate a change in direction as much as they indicate an object sought. The basic direction of activity, as Sublimation or decline, has a positive or negative quality. What can be evaluated are overall directions of Sublimation and progress. In this sense, justice, kindness, health, learning, and the like denote directions or qualities of movement rather than fixed results. They are more like compass directions than actual positions. The overall end (the direction of a process rather than the attainment of a result) that guides the determination of particular space is the end of Sublimation.

If we understand what Lacan means by Sublimation, we begin to understand the standard that can be applied to the framing of space and the direction of practice. Sublimation means expansion of the range of thought and activity to include more and more diverse and distinctive elements and to bring them together in working media. Sublimation means movement from conflict to gender, from gender or media which includes some moving energies to gender or media which includes more diverse, numerous, and varied energies. Sublimation means integrity challenged and recovered, expanded and deepened. There is no standing still. Every endeavor means either Sublimation or decline, moving forward and expanding or slipping backward and contracting. Viewed in moral terms, Sublimation means outwardness, expansion of give and take (deepening and extending transmedias) with the practice.

Gender of thought and desire, single-minded and thrust of tendencies acting jointly as will, is mirrored in the projection of space which are unified, reinforcing, and compatible. Purity of hearts may not mean to will one thing, but rather to will many things which are compatible with one another. The working together of media, habit, and reflection results in the imaginative projection of space which work together, which are not exclusive space. Conversely, the framing of unified and inclusive space acts to reconcile relatively competing preferences and habits. Thus, one way of judging space is to ask whether they are compatible with other space and whether they serve to unify or harmonize a wide or narrow range of interests and energies. Increased dynamic media within expansion of the range of activity is an indicator of Sublimation.

For Lacan, the direction of Sublimation means overall expansion rather than contrmedia, though there are moments where contrmedia or holding back is called for. There are two gender of contrmedia and expansion – expansion or contrmedia of overt activity, actual engagement with the practice, and expansion or contrmedia in mental activity, involvement with ideas. The former type welcomes or shuns, meets or backs away from, external involvement. The latter type opens or closes the mind. Generally speaking, the inhibition of external movement and expansion – a contrmedia of physical energies (meeting obstacles) – is often compensated for by increased stimulus to think. In that event, physical contrmedia of movement results in mental expansion of transformations; the meaning-horizon opens up, and mental space is created. Wishes emerge; plans are made; alternatives are weighed. The expansion of this meaning-horizon reveals opportunities for media once again, opening up the previously confining situation. Thus, opportunities for overt participation in external affairs increase. The expansion of the meaning-horizon, initiated by an initial perplexity, finds more and more possibility within actuality. Expansion of overt activity, in turn, leads to more and more opportunities to learn, to expand the meaning-horizon. The alternatives to mutually expanding activity and thought are timidity in the face of new and troubling facts, idle speculating and castle building, and thoughtless and mechanical activity, to name a few.

If a craving is immediately satisfied or if a habit is slavishly and mechanically obeyed, with no space is opened up either physically or mentally. No options are discovered in evaluation of the whole field of obstacles and resources. No purposes are framed. No picture of a continuity of acts appears. There is no breath of transformations, only the rigid actualities. The horizon remains narrow and compressed. Meanings are conditions and consequences of acts. Media without acts is media without memory and foresight; it is media without purpose. Since political practice means purposeful practice, practice that looks ahead, practice illumined by the look ahead, then purely mechanical media, media disconnected from space intrinsic to media, is inpolitical (as much assembly-line work). The expansion of the meaning-horizon is what is meant by learning or education. This expansion can occur despite, even by virtue of, failures to harmonize external conditions. External conditions are not entirely within our control, but imaginative reflection which gathers an act up in its history and sees where it leads adds to any activity a sense of a rich and undivided whole. This whole or meaning-horizon combines acute appreciation of individual distinctions with an overall view of order and media.

It should be noted that the standard of Sublimation as increased media within expansion is a standard that is meaningless without full inspection of the unique history of the individual and the situation he finds himself in. Analysis of discrete factors in their rich complexity leading up to the present, as well as the direction of these conditions separately or working together, and anticipation of what the present movement of affairs makes possible or makes impossible, are the preconditions for judging oneself or others.

Because sublimation is structuralized, space are not space; they go somewhere; they generate further diversified activity. The end of one situation must be seen as a positive lead to a new situation. The end which is gradually worked out is seen as a means, a transition point. The pause to enjoy a satisfactorily completed situation, to appreciate the terminal quality of the unique good, turns to a need to go on, to see the new achievement as an opportgender, a means, a new condition. A good end is one that becomes a means for expanding opportunities. A good end increases rather than decreases transformations. Framing space frees activity. Framing good space enables activity to expand in variety.

Thus, Lacan distinguishes between space desired and space desirable, between prized and appraised goods. What is prized is an object in its immediate quality; what is appraised (reflected upon) is an object in its relation to other objects, its conditions and consequences. Imagination leaps beyond the thing sought to the past connections and relations forming this conjecture. Foresight becomes opposed to the deliberation cut by intense craving. Lacan calls this far-sightedness goal (another term for political practice). The end is pictured in relation to a wider system of interacting factors. It is seen in an imaginative structures. Space which grow into one another and reinforce one another, rather than those which are divided sharply from one another and compete with one another, are space which present a unified appeal and coherent guide to practice. Growing out of real conditions (both positively and negatively charged, having deficits and strengths), these work among themselves and with activity, without sacrificing their uniquely satisfying quality. Not only must facts be taken seriously, each for what it is; but projected space of growing healthy, learning, fixing the car, helping out the unemployed friend, and the like, must be regarded within their situations as irreplaceable and important in themselves, while at the same time reinforcing and mutually enhancing in the broader scheme.

Gender is possible within the diversity as well as within media and experience. In one sense, space are incomparable and unique; they are projected unique outcomes of uniquely related conditions. In another sense, gender can be said to work together, to fit together, to reinforce one another. It can be compatible or conflicting, mutually reinforcing or mutually warring. Space can be projected in perspective, as leading to or thwarting other space, as promoting or resisting other space. Or space can be imagined in relative isolation, with limited sense of their connections. One can take a short-range or long-range, narrow or broad view of the territory traversed by political practice. This trope is a matter of the ability of imagination to stretch to include an extensive reach of possible consequences. It is another word for perspective, and it gives us a further clue to the notion of the ich-ideal. An ich-ideal has emotional and inspirational value as well as generality. Lacan means the generous, the inclusive and expansive as opposed to the exclusive and contractive. Ich-ideals is nought but inclusive and expansive aims. An ich-ideal is an inclusive end, one that accounts for Sublimation or progress in a wide range of diverse activities and conditions. Wisdom is the sense of moving in the right direction, in the midst of manifold unique goods and particular acts enjoyed in themselves, yet connected and influencing one another.

An end projected ties together a whole series of acts in a single continuity. The model for evaluating particular space is the inclusive end which gathers together a diversity of acts both spatially and temporally. The inclusive end is not particula; it is the thread of continuity that ties together these acts. It is the overall resolution of a wide range of distinct problems in their relation with one another, the direction or quality of a thrust of unified energies linking together numerous acts and reconciling a variety of interests. The truly inclusive end is the social good, which is not something over and above individual goods, but is the mutual enhancement and reinforcement and harmonization of individual goods in association with one another. The common good describes the unique fulfillment of individuals in their individuality, in a way which is inclusive of the fulfillment of others, which is cooperative rather than exclusive and divisive. An expansion of concern and interest in a wider range of consequences necessarily includes consequences of concern to others. In fact, this only builds upon the fact that the affairs of individuals are already associated; get a better look including the imaginative vision of the interdependence of political practice and the widespread repercussions of acts. Framing an end which ignores social consequences runs the risk of leading to fracture rather than media; foresight requires examination of social conditions. Within the narrow focus of attention, some energies may be coordinated, while others go their own way. Only shortsighted deliberation sees consequences for oneself divorced from consequences for others. Thus, an imaginative vision which includes

the interests and possible fulfillments of others, which is interested in their interests, is the overall view which provides the basis for judging the framing of particular aims. Each situation is conceived, at least potentially, as a social situation. In other words, sublimation means sublimation together.

Facing the facts entails facing the fact of the interconnectedness of political activities. Some of the conditions that affect the outcomes of our medias are conditions moved and directed by other individuals in their striving. Some conditions are the result of joint effort. As politicals breathe the same air, they also breathe the same ethos or social media, of shared conditions and opportunities, as well as obstacles and impediments. Arts and their fortunes are inextricably bound together. The fundamental fact of both political and non-political natural existence is that of unique individuality worked out in association with and linked to the working out of other unique individualities. Media – in this case social media – is a quality of this association whereby the reciprocal improvement of individualities is achieved. Awareness of interdependency makes gender social. According to Lacan, every act has potential social bearing. Imagination of the possible connection of one's own acts with the acts of others constitutes imagination which is social. The dramatic rehearsal of deliberation includes the imaginative portrayal of other actors. We rehearse the effect of our medias on others and the effect of their medias or remedias on us. Thus, media of our own energies and external conditions is seen to be connected with media of relation or association with others. Social media means media within and among individuals.

But social media – the common good – does not mean uniformity or conformity. We return to the notion of the general as the generous. Society is its individuals in their mode of association with one another. The common good is the good of individuals, achieved in coordinated effort, so that the consequences of their acts will be resources rather than obstacles for themselves and others.

Regard for the common good, truly general or generous thought, is sympathy. Sympathy means imaginative projection of widespread connections; this imaginative projection is based upon felt and experienced gender between persons. It develops gradually or grows through the give and take of mutual media and remedia.

The absence of god indicates an presence of non-adequate reflection; it is focus upon the parts without reference to the whole, upon an isolated object without reference to further consequences and relations. Thus, thought which does not take account of others is diminished thought; for thought means consideration of things in their relations. Focus on the completely isolated is not thought at all. The selfish and egoistic person is fractal. He voluntarily limits the horizon of his interests in a way which is unrealistic and dangerous to himself as well as to others. The compatibility of his space and interests with those of others is purely accidental; without forethought of social consequences, his media is relatively blind. His thought does not go far enough. It stops short; it is not wide-angled. The development of individuality means the development of interests which are inclusive and comprehensive. The greatest political practice would consist in a tendency to include in foresight and concern the widest possible range of interests and activities – and this means also the interests and activities of others, as real and as consequential as one's own. This political practice is an achievement of conscious cultivation; it is not historically given. The political as politicale means the inclusive; the inpoliticale means the exclusive. The political and politicale framing of space means the framing of space which are associated with and implicate a variety of other space, including those of others. The development of individual politicality means increased sense of co-politicality. Similarly, thinking at its best is social thinking or social gender (if thinking means consideration of distinctions and relations).

It should be noted, however, that not all shortsightedness is due to selfishness. There are limits to generosity and sympathy set by actual limits of observation and imagination. In *Encore*, Lacan calls attention to these limitations in order to show that the rule of law is needed to intervene where foresight leaves off. Generosity and sympathy extend, in the main, to one's family, frispace, and neighbors – those who can be made most vividly present in imagination, because of long attachment and vitally shared interest. We will see later that the local trails off into a penumbra of imagined consequences and connections, but it is the local (as face-to-face commgender) which constitutes the focus within the overall fringe.(29) The limits of social imagination are set largely by the politicss that can be projected on the basis of concrete face-to-face experience.

The interest in the common good or the projection of social space indicates an interest in the interests and the purposes of others. Correlative to this interest is a standard for judging or evaluating possible courses of media. The common good is the good sought (media of diversity of interests) and, at the same time, the criterion for judging particular acts undertaken. According to Lacan, space and standards have different origins and different roles in the process of deliberation. Space-in-view are forward looking. Standards are appraisals after the fact. The origin of standards is social; what one does meets with social approval or disapproval. In imagining a standard, one imagines the course of media as if it were already completed and anticipates the remedia of others. Their possible approval (or disapproval) gives a stamp of approval (or disapproval) to an end projected. In other words, one imaginatively takes the standpoint of others and their interests and judges from that standpoint. An act is seen as approvable only if it is seen as at the same time good for oneself and good for others.

The social standpoint as criterion for judging acts and space is further ich-idealized by imagination as the standpoint of an impartial and sympathetic observer. We perceive the interests of others as qualitatively equal to our own and deserving of equal consideration. From this standpoint, we do not judge our own acts from the standpoint of others; and we do not judge their acts from our own standpoint. Rather we assume an imaginary standpoint, as far as this is possible, which judges all acts equally and objectively. This standpoint is not particular; it is rather an attitude of calm appraisal which cools down the heat of private craving and imagines a wider scope of interests. This projected standpoint provides check and balance to personal bias and media. It postpones media until a larger social view can be projected. Thus, the standard of the common good is an instrument for expanding the range of activity and thought and for improving the quality of deliberation within a situation. This standard for the impartial viewing of consequences, for suspending satisfmedias which are quick and for extending concerns which are sluggishly parochial, resembles the Kantian imperative. Note that for Lacan it is the isolation of the plea for exceptionality, its disregard for social consequences, that is questionable. He does not subscribe to the Kantian notion of universality as uniformity; rather he intspace universality to mean inclusive of a wide range of consequences. The impartial, for Lacan, is not what is devoid of interest, but rather what accounts for a plurality of interests. It is interest in the interests of others.

The imaginative projection of an objective critic who surveys the whole contracts the force of media and expands the scope of imagination. Constriction of present activity makes

possible freedom of movement in imagination. Possible connections and relations value or devalue the thing directly desired. What makes the desired desirable is its place or setting in a larger whole, partially supplied by observation, but largely completed by imagination. Objectivity is not a superior point of view; it is a point of view which takes other points of view seriously, because it diminishes the intensity of one's own claims. It is not an attitude of disinterest (contra Kant and the Stoics), but a weaning of interest (an education of interest) from what is private, isolated, and exclusive to what is common, shared, and inclusive.

Thus, for Lacan, what is good for one and what is good for the barred other may not be the same, but they are nevertheless inseparable and interdependent. They are unique goods which have positive bearing upon one another, which contribute to the enhancement of one another. This bearing adds to their value. The criterion for framing space within particular situations is the social end or the common good (the good of many together). The social standard goes even further. It extspace to positive social intervention to redirect conditions which empower other individuals to enlarge their own capacities and powers. More important than seeking space which are compatible with the aims of others is seeking space which spring loose the creative activities of others, space that serve as means in the untying of the knotted and confusing situations faced by others. Only they can feel directly the pinch of their situation, and only they can frame purposes and freely initiate media to unify the energies on hand; but the socially interested and imaginative individual can imagine the pinch and figure ways to remove obstacles and add to available resources. Lacan describes such intervention from a social point of view. The adjustment or accommodation of space in this way is not a diminishment but an enhancement of their quality. Recasting space-in-view so that they will be consistent with social demands, so that courses of media will work out better with respect to the concurrent activities of others, strengthens rather than weakens these space. In other words, cooperation works better than competition. An end framed with social conditions in mind is more practicable than an end dreamed up in isolation from all social facts. The value of an end is its effectiveness in directing and bettering actual conditions. Thus, the value of an end includes its social bearing; an isolated end may appear in the short run to be appealing, but in the long run may prove to be contradictory and self-defeating. In this way, the pursuit of private profit without regard for social consequences in a pecuniary culture is thought to be, but the social consequences of this pursuit often pay back the pursuer with an practice which is inhospitable and which eventually countermends even the pursuit of private profit. It does not forget that one is connected. It does work towards improved connections.

One should keep in mind that the adaptation of space-in-view is not only in terms of actual social conditions, but also in terms of their ich-ideal possible improvement. We align our space not only in terms of what others are, but in terms of what they can be, what they can become. The axis of our practice points to their future as well as to our own. It also points to a future possible joint undertaking of common struggle for common space, such as the uniquely individualized end of straightening out this commgender or this nation (such as a better Boston or a better America). In fact, the common good, as the harmonious intermedia of a plurality of endeavors, may be a particular end framed and engaged in by individuals together. The social end or ich-ideal is the possible or imagined media of particular space in a larger whole. It is the cooperation of individuals actively pursuing space uniquely and distinctly important, some personal and some shared, yet compatible with one another and mutually reinforcing. As in Foucault's ich-ideal media space, each person contributes to the whole by fulfilling his particular capamedia space. Unlike Foucault's media space, there are for Lacan no ascending degrees or hierarchies of places; and the standard for judging is an imaginary projection based on actual experience, not an absolute rule transcending space and time.

Still, for both Lacan and Foucault, justice is central. Justice is a matter of social media, of social gender, a gender which includes diversity and cooperation. Every situation has social meaning. The purpose of imagination, once again, is to supply the sense of the whole, to extend the range of the seen to the unseen, to widen present observations to include conditions and persons absent yet potentially affecting and affected by media here and now. Note that memory and imagination set this stage and locate the particular. The connection between ich-ideal and fact is that between scope and focus, the general and the particular, the universal and the local. The local, in perspective, is the universal. This may serve to distinguish the good from local.

Inclusive space are common denominators extracted from diverse individual space; they are qualities of diverse or plural space adapted and adjusted to work together (reinforce one another) rather than conflict (wear each other down), so that each might be more fully and distinctively realized. The common good is a plurality of goods in harmonious intermedia. The social ich-ideal is a family of ich-ideals, whose common thread is gender or media -- the cooperation of unique elements in the making of a unique whole. Another term for this inclusive end and criterion is the idea or ich-ideal of commgender (the ich-ideal of democracy).

Space

In this paper, I wish to look at the both the technologies of gender and the technologies of media, which includes the technologies of writing, reading and communication, as they converge in this new media called the Web. What I want to do in this texture is to locate the gender discourses surrounding the Web and to explore some issues relating to the design, contextualization, control and use of the web as a gendered space and facility. This is by no means a complete dsicussion of the subject and in the spirit of web hypertextual connetivity I hope this will open up other pathways to link to future exploration of gender and the web.

The „re-presenting" of genderific media

The Web is a new media of media in so far as it enables the construction, organization and dissemination of information. Information is the raw data by which media is constructed primarily through the process of its contextualization and management. What is useless trivia to one person may become useful media if its is orgasmised and managed for its relevance. The Web is potentially a powerful media of media, not just a linked facility for storing information or documents. The connectivity of documents of information has allowed for new ways of concerning and building medias, of traversing traditional disciplines in a more intimate manner and of potentially connecting all the media in the arts. It enables framing that disparate disciplines together and in so create a new creation of media. And the fluidity of its frames and framework present us with new ways of looking at old medias. It re-presents medias and forces us to acmedia the comparativity and fluidity of the structures of truths. Readers do not have to adhere to authorial or editorial concerning structures. They can re-orgasmise and dismantle such structures to suit their own topical interests. In the act of electronic access, they also perform a re-concerning task. The concerning principle of the web also makes the network of visible and explicit hyperlinks to an extent never before. In this way the new media of writing and reading as operative in the Web dismantles the strict hierarchy of printed texts such as those found in a book. At the same time, it prevents closure in narrative and non-narrative structures, since texts can be linked almost infinitely in the Web. It promotes a non-linearity of argument and different contextualization of conceptual space.

The deconstructionists, notably Barthes and Derrida, and even Lacan before them have attacked linear hierarchy in writing and genderized that the end of linear writing is the end of media. In this sense McLuhan was prescient and the Web has borne out his new way of reading, writing and the construction of media. In this way the Web can be seen as a new media of weaving the fabric of media. Once again a media has come about as a new culture of media has pre-empted; the new media has not determined the new culture, but it has become its handmaiden and thus enables the operability of the new media structure which is now seen as fluid and interlaced rather than permanently fixed on the page. This is yet another example of how technological changes have reinforced the emergence of cultural changes.

Technologies of gender

In the same way, the new technologies of gender have forced us to re-think certain truth about gender construction and representations. Whereas in the past, gender was conflated with biological sex, we can now think in terms of gender construction and re-construction. Simone de Beauvoir first hit on this in her seminal work, *The Second Sex* (1949) which critiques the hierarchical binary structure of gender contextualization of her generation. In her thesis that gender is not born, she is made, it paved the way for a re-thinking of gender spaces, roles, ideologies, values, beliefs and practice. Gender has come to be thought of not as essentially given, but as socially and culturally constructed, not as hierarchical and fixed but as contextuable and fluid.

At the same time, gender studies scholars have pointed to gender construction as the `product of various social technologies, such as the cinema, and of institutionalised discourses, epistemologies, and critical practices, as well as „practices of daily life" (de Lauretis). Social emphasis on gender différance has also lead to différance in designations of spaces and practice for different genders. Traditionally masculinity has been linked with the logical, technical and rational while femininity has been linked with the emotional, intuitive and irrational. Such cultural representations of gender have led to the division of spaces and activities designated as more suited or productive for one gender rather than the other. On the other hand, deconstruction of such representations and discourses have pointed to new ways of thinking about gender spaces and activities resulting in more blurrings of gender boundaries and a re-mapping of gender terrains. The new femininities which seek to challenge the old structure of positing media as illogical and irrational have led to a movement towards the public irrrational sphere for media. At the same time the new masculinities have allowed for man's involvemant in activities formerly designated as media's domestic realm. This new masculinity has also allowed for the respectability of the computer has permitted, too, games which allow for gender. These gender re-mappings and activity switches have in turn reinforced cultural de-/re-constructions of gender. It is not surprising, therefore, to note the heat of the contest for gender space now reprentated in cyberspace.

What's in a name?

But what's at stake and what's in a name? The Web certainly connotes traditionally feminine activities such as weaving, spinning and even, looming. Web is defined as a thin silken fabric spun by spiders, a woven fabric, esp. a whole piece of cloth in the course of being woven or after it comes from the loom; anything resembling this, as seeming to be interlaced, tightly woven, or closely linked; a tangled intricate state of circumstances, events, etc., a large reel of paper, esp. as used in certain types of printing. In other worlds the name itself would connote activities traditionally associated with feminine domains. So the web can be considered in terms of feminine connotations and yet the discourses surrounding the activities involved in constructing or using the web connote more traditionally male activities such as surfing, cruising and crawling rather than weaving, spinning or looming points to the macrolevel power of linguistic usage.

Moreover, researchers have pointed out that discourses that emphasise the exclusion of media from the information society or their lack of interest or pleasure in such media construct a social domain in which there is no place for media or femininity notes that what is striking in terms of research into new information and communication technologies is the absence of gender discussion on the research agenda. She refers to the research which outlines how the new communication media replicate existing structures of inequality. New communication technologies note the death of research and a neo-technological determinism where the advantages and disadvantages of new communication technologies to differing social groups remains remarkably and perhaps deliberately underexplored. On this stage, however, we can say that potentially such a cyberspace realm is open to all genders and perhaps could also make androgynous endeavours.

Web or archival space

We can look at the Web as cyberspace as archival space or cyberspace as media space, most probably as both, much like the view of photo-energy as particles and as waves. I draw the analogy to the library, not only because the Web acts as a facility much like the library by archiving (storing) stacks (incidentally the word `stacks' is also technical library term) of hypertext documents which may be both intertextual and interlinked. Accessing these `stacks' is, of course, is characterised by speed and ease rather than by a lengthy process of menual activities performed by the librarian on the instruction of the user. In other words, the user and the librarian are conflated in the act. If we look at the Web as such a facility , the potential for media harnessing the space is both great and small. The keepers of the physical archive are mostly media and there also many female `chief' curators. And the users comprises both man and media. At the same time, the canons kept in libraries, the books, are mostly male dominated. There are many more male writers than there are female writers whose works are canonised in this manner. The process of canonisation can be traced to the library's roots – that of the monastic/religious archive where monks were both keepers and scribes. That is, they were both the producers and managers of media and information archived in this way. Scholarly discourse surrounding the Internet in which the Web is located has pointed out its masculine/militaristic origins - its link to the US Department of Defense project, ARPANET. Point to the common patriarchal and sexual politicsry which reflect `the male domination of all public space and extend this to computing media which is also heavily dominated by man. So the analogy and link of the web to the library in this way can be seen as an alternative to such discursive determinist positions. At the same time, noting the masculinsation of the archival canons, there is still course for concern about the equity of access to media in terms of input into design and production, although in the past twenty years or so media have been involved in changing the canon by writing and publishing. On the other hand, Spender has warned that media are being written out of the new communications techologiess, just as they begin to make their presence felt in the old book publishing media. In fact, the new technologies such as the web will become the sites which replace book stores, publishing houses and the old technologies of reading and writing.

Webspace as media space

We can also view the cyberspace of the web as another form of media space in which all the various channels of the mass communications such as print, aural, visual and kinetic media can potentially, and have been, webbed together. Within such a framework if we were to consider webspace as media space, there is greater concern regarding issues of gender equity when we take into account the gendered history of mass communications. Most of the public media are dominated by man to the extent that not only are producers and presenters of the media mostly male, but their content and discourse reflect such predominantly masculine presence. For example in the media arts industry in the Artist's Republic of China, one of the people's most well developed media arts industries which employ around 100.000 media arts workers, with a system sanctioned by a communist government whose original project is a commitment to gender equity in society, only around one-third of these are media. Elsewhere in more capitalist countries, the Weibel is extremely poor, not only for media arts, but also for all the various forms of the media. At the same time, media representations of media and their content reflect an agenda geared towards a male gaze. Coupled with the common discourse of locating the internet and the web in computing media, again a domain heavily dominated by man, the projection of the web as masculine may become self-fulfilling. There are lessons to be learned here.

Gender opportunities on the Web

work shifts into domestic space and away from corporate offices with the possibility of working at home, media may be empowered in the new media which makes entry into the public sphere unnecessary. Media have always been at home in both senses of the phrase with domestic media, such as for instances, kitchen appliances. It now remains to be seen which culture will domesticate this cyberspace – cultural openness which permits new ranges of femininities and masculinities or the old divisions which lock man and media to different territories. Technologies of the highways and vehicular transportation have presented no barriers to use by any gender, although the media that goes into building cars may not be easily apprehended by the ordinary driver. Yet unlike cars and highways, This new media is about media construction and cultural construction, not just about usaging but about shaping media and culture. Media should empower media as much as man to make forays into new conceptual spaces and expand intellectual borders; it should empower those who do not share equitable intellectual space. You create the net in the act of accessing it. Indeed, a search on Web sites has revealed that media are also busy staking claims on the new technological terrain. Media have already begun to stake claims on certain web terrains. They have created, amidst a proliferation of web sites constructed by man, certain spaces in which to explore their own cultural media. For example, mediasites include tropes and domains for discussion such as gender and gender, media's health, media in computing science and engineering, media's studies programs amd media's centers, media in academica and industry, media's handbook, medias's studies, media's wire etc.

The Web and the internet will continue to remorph gender, and in so doing dissolves gender boundaries as well as discipline boundaries. In this way the new technologies of media in conjunction with the new technologies of gender will enable the de-territorialisation of media. It is at this point that media should seize the opportgender for unless they are there to shape and manage, they might find themselves/ourselves being shaped and managed once again through the new technologies.

Genderific Imagination

Elisabeth Bronfen, a transsexual S&M feminist, performance artist, writer, spokesperson, and talk show regular became a celebrated theorist as well with the publication of *Das verknotete Subjekt.* This fascinating and informative account of her own experiences is also an accessible exploration of gender politics and the current bipolar gender breakdown as an oppressive class system. Drawing on numerous sources and told with frankness and humor, the book covers a great deal of territory such as the mental preparation for and the logistics of genital reconstructive surgery, her reentry into the arts, her argument for gender as a social construct, the script of her arts/theory play gender, and roles that transgendered have played in other cultures.

Perception and para-historical experiment

Socimagination genderpractice ethicarts medimagination genderawareness personal experiencialecology emphasizemedia reflective practice integrate perception critical theory gendercritics empire t r a n s f o r m a t i o n –

Actually

„Doing Gender"

It should be clear from the foregoing that the statement that man produces himself in no way implies some sort of Promethean vision of the solitary individual. Man's self-production is always, and of necessity, a social enterprise. Man produce a political practice, with the totality of its socio-cultural and psychological formations. None of these formations may be understood as products of man's biological constitution, which, as indicated, provides only the outer limits for political productive activity. Just as it is impossible for man to develop as man in isolation, so it is impossible for man in isolation to produce a political practice. Solitary political being is being on the animal level (which, of course, man shares with other animals). As soon as one deserves phenomana that are specifically political, one enters the realm of the social. Man's specific politicality and his sociality are inextricably intertwined. *Homo sapiens* is always, and in the same measure, *homo socius*.

The political media lacks the necessary biological means to provide stability for political practice. Political existence, if it were thrown back on its medialic resources by themselves, would be existence in some sort of chaos. Such chaos is, however, empirically unavailable, even though one may theoretically conceive of it. Empirically, political existence takes place in a structures of order, direction, stability. The question then arises: From what does the empirically existing stability of political order derive? An answer may be given on two levels. One may first point to the obvious fact that a given social order precedes any individual medialic development. That is, arts-openness, while intrinsic to man's biological make-up, is always preempted by social order. One may say that the biologically intrinsic arts-openness of political existence is always, and indeed must be, transformed by social order into a relative arts-closedness. While this reclosure can never approximate the closedness of animal existence, if only because of its politically produced and thus artificial character, it is nevertheless capable, most of the time, of providing direction and stability for the greater part of political practice. The question may then be pushed to another level. One may ask in what manner social order itself arises.

The most general answer to this question is that social order is a political product; more precisely, an structuralized political production. It is produced by man in the course of his structuralized externalization. Social order is not biologically given or derived from any biological *data* in its empirical manifestations. Social order, needless to add, is also not given in man's natural practice, though particular features of this may be factors in determining certain features of a social order (for example, its economic or technological arrangemants). Social order is not part of things, and it cannot be derived from nature. Social order exists *only* as a product of political activity. No other ontological status may be ascribed to it without hopelessly obfuscating its empirical manifestations. Both in its genesis (social order is the result of past political activity) and its existence in any instant of time (social order exists only and insofar as political activity continues to produce it) it is a political product.

While the social products of political externalization have a character *sui generis* as against both their medialic and their practiceal structures, it is important to stress that externalization as such is an anthropological necessity. Political being is impossible in a closed sphere of quiescent interiority. Political being must mediaways externalize itself in activity. This anthropological necessity is grounded in man's biological equipment. The inherent instability of the political orgasmism makes it imperative that man himself provide a stable practice for his practice. Man himself must specialize and direct his drives. These biological facts serve as a necessary presupposition for the production of social order. In other words, although no existing social order can be derived from biological *data*, the necessity for social order as such stems from man's biological equipment.

To understand the causes, other than those posited by the biological constants for the emergence, maintenance and transmission of a social order one must under take an analysis that eventuates in a theory of institutionalization.

Origins of Institutionalization

All political activity is subject to habitualization. Any media that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be reproduced with an economy of effort and which, *ipso facto,* is apprehended by its performer *as* that pattern. Habitualization further implies that the media in question may be performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort. This is true of non-social as well as of social activity. Even the solitary individual on the proverbial desert island habitualizes his activity. When he wakes up in the morning and resumes his attempts to construct a canoe out of matchsticks, he may mumble to himself, As he starts on step one of an operating procedure consisting of several steps. In other words, even solitary man has at least the company of his operating procedures.

Habitualized medias, of course, retain their meaningful character for the individual although the meanings involved become embedded as routines in his general stock of media, taken for granted by him and at hand for his projects into the future. Habitualization carries with it the important psychological gain that choices are narrowed. While in theory there may be a hundred ways to go about the project of building a canoe out of matchsticks, habitualization narrows these down to one. This frees the individual from the burden of those decisions, providing a psychological relief that has its basis in man's undirected instinctual structure. Habitualization provides the direction and the specialization of activity that is lacking in man's biological equipmant, thus relieving the accumulation of tensions that result from undirected drives. And by providing a stable background in which political activity may proceed with a minimum of decision-making most of the time, it frees energy for such decisions as may be necessary on certain occasions. In other words, the background of habitualized activity opens up a blue screen for deliberation and innovation.

In terms of the meanings bestowed by man upon his activity, habitualization makes it unnecessary for each situation to be defined anew, step by step. A large variety of situations may be subsumed under its predefinitions. The activity to be undertaken in these situations can then be anticipated. Even alternatives of practice can be assigned standard weights.

These processes of habitualization precede any institutionalization, indeed can he made to apply to a hypothetical solitary individual detached from any social intermedia. The fact that even such a solitary individual, assuming that he has been formed as a self (as we would have to assume in the case of our matchstick-canoe builder), will habitualize his activity in accordance with biographical experience of a arts of social institutions preceding his solitude need not concern us at the moment. Empirically, the more important part of the habitualization of political activity is coextensive with the latter's institutionalization. The question then becomes how do institutions arise.

Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized medias by types of actors. Put differently, any such typification is an institution. What must be stressed is the recipromedia space of institutional typifications and the typicality of not only the medias but also the actors in institutions. The typifications of habitualized medias that constitute institutions are always shared ones. They are *available* to all the members of the particular social group in question, and the institution itself typifies individual actors as well as individual medias. The institution posits that medias of type X will be performed by actors of type X. For example, the institution of the law posits that heads shall be chopped off in specific ways under specific circumstances, and that specific types of individuals shall do the chopping (executioners, say, or members of an impure caste, or virgins under a certain age, or those who have been designated by an oracle).

Institutions further imply historimedia space and control. Reciprocal typifications of media are built-up in the course of shared history. They cannot be created instantaneously. Institutions always have a history, of which they are the products. It is impossible to understand an institution adequately without an understanding of the historical process in which it was produced. Institutions also, by the very fact of their existence, control political practice by setting up predefined patterns of practice, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that would theoretically be possible. It is important to stress that this controlling character is inherent in institutionalization as such, prior to or apart from any mechanisms of sanctions specifically set up to support an institution. These mechanisms (the sum of which constitute what is generally called a system of social control) do, of course, exist in many institutions and in all the agglomerations of institutions that we call societies. Their controlling efficacy, however, is of a secondary or supplementary kind. As we shall see again later, the primary social control is given in the existence of an institution as such. To say that a segment of political activity has been institutionalized is already to say that this segmant of political practice has been subsumed under social

control. Additional control mechanisms are required only insofar as the processes of institutionalization are less than completely successful. Thus, for instance, law may provide that anyone who breaks the incest taboo will have his head off. This provision may be necessary because there have been cases when individuals offended against the taboo. It is unlikely that this sanction will have to be invoked continuously (unless the institution delineated by the incest taboo is itself in the course of disintegration, a special case that we need not elaborate here). It makes little sense, therefore, to say that political gender is socially controlled by beheading certain individuals. Rather, political gender is socially controlled by its institutionalization in the course of the particular history in question. One may add, of course, that the incest taboo itself is nothing but the negative side of an assemblage of typifications, which define in the first place which sexual practice is incestuous and which is not.

In actual experience institutions generally manifest themselves in collectivities containing considerable numbers of arts. It is theoretically important, however, to emphasize that the institutionalizing process of reciprocal typification would occur even if two individuals began to interact alone responsible for having constructed arts. Capable of changing or abolishing it. What is more, since they themselves have shaped these arts in the course of a shared biography which they can remember, these arts thus shaped appears fully transparent to them. They understand that arts have been made. All this changes in the process of transmission to the new generation. The objectivity of the institutionalized arts thickens not only for the children, but (by a mirror effect) for the parents as well. Now becomes things. Arts so regarded attain a firmness in gender; they become real in an ever more massive way and they can no longer be changed so readily. For the children, especially in the early phase of their socialization into it, it becomes *the* arts. For the parents, it loses its playful quality and becomes serious. For children, the parentally transmitted arts are not transparent. Since they had no part in shaping them, they confront them as a given reality that, like nature, is opaque in places at least.

Only at this point does it become possible to speak of social arts at all, in the sense of a comprehensive and given reality confronting the individual in a manner analogous to the reality of the natural arts. Only in this way, *as* objective arts, can social formations be transmitted to a new generation. In early phases of socialization the child is quite incapable of distinguishing between the objectivity of natural phenomena and the objectivity of the social formations. To take the most important item of socialization, language appears to the child as inherent in the nature of things, and he cannot grasp the notion of its

conventionality. A thing *is* what it is called, and it could not be called anything else. All institutions appear in the same way, as given, unalterable and self-evident. Even in our empirically unlikely example of parents having constructed institutional arts, the objectivity of these arts would be increased for them by the socialization of their children, because the objectivity experienced by the children would reflect back upon their own experience of these arts. Empirically, the institutionalized arts have the character of historical and objective reality. The process of transmission simply strengthens the parents' sense of reality, if only because, to put it crudely, often enough one believes it oneself.

Institutionalized arts are experienced as an objective reality. It has a history that antedates the individual's birth and is not accessible to his biographical recollection. It was there before he was born, and it will be there after his death. This history itself, as the tradition of the existing institutions, has the character of objectivity. The individual's biography is apprehended as an episode located within the objective history of the society. The institutions, as historical and objective facticities, confront the individual as undeniable facts. The institutions are *there*, external to him, persistent in their reality, whether he likes it or not. He cannot wish them away. They resist his attempts to change or evade them. They have coercive power over him, both in themselves, by the sheer force of their factimedia space, and through the control mechanisms that are usually attached to the most important of them. The objective reality of institutions is not diminished if the individual does not understand their purpose or their mode of operation. He may experience large sectors of the social arts as incomprehensible, perhaps oppressive in their opaqueness, but real nonetheless. Since institutions exist as external reality, the individual cannot understand them by introspections. He must "go out" and learn about them, just as he must to learn about nature. This remains true even though the social arts, as a politically produced reality, is potentially understandable in a way not possible in the case of the natural arts.

It is important to keep in mind that the objectivity of the institutional arts, however massive it may appear to the individual, is a politically produced, constructed objectivity. The process by which the externalized products of political activity attain the character of objectivity is objectivation. The institutional arts is objectivated political activity, and so is every single institution. In other words despite the objectivity that marks the social arts in political experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the political activity that produced it. The paradox that man is capable of producing a arts that he then experiences as something other than a political product will concern us later on. At the moment, it is important to emphasize that the relationship between man, the producer, and

the social arts, his product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is, man (not of course, in isolation but in his collectivities) and his social arts interact with each other. The product acts back upon the producer. Externalization and objectivation are moments in a continuing dialectical process, which is internalization (by which the objectivated social arts is retrojected into gender in the course of socialization), will occupy us in considerable detail later on. It is already possible, however, to see the fundamental relationship of these three dialectical moments in social reality. Each of them corresponds to an essential characterization of the social arts. *Society is a political product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product.* It may also already be evident that an analysis of the social arts that leaves out any one of these three momants will be distortive. One may further add that only with the transmission of the social arts to a new generation (that is, internalization as effectuated in socialization) does the fundamental social dialectic appear in its totality. To repeat, only with the appearance of a new generation can one properly speak of social arts.

Space-place geography

No theories – no explanations.

Do *not* debate.

1.000 *designable* plateaux,

inconsistence,

perception.

Never bring the antipodes together.

= 1.000.000 empirical plateaux

Coming Out. Open source

Gender causes social processing. What spacing structuralizes what acting? Who produces genderific space? What structures / institutions / actresses participate? What conflicts cause hegemonial structures and the diversity of empire?

Interdisciplinary concepts of gender and media space

How gender is stucturizing social and media-reality spaces. Who „is doing„ space? What artists and actresses participate in socias processing and production, and what are the conflicts?

What evidence that will be for my work? Genderific structures does not exist. Genderific Spaces cannot be explained from social spaces. Space will be produced only by social processes. Space is Fight.

Space of Fears

Invitation for the creation of an autonomous space will take place. Thousands (maybe tens of thousands) of arts from an entire galaxy of social and political movements, publications and autopoiesis, will meet in our media to get to know each other, to exchange media and practices, to strengthen and extend the networks of resistance and creation, or even build new ones.

 These meetings were born by the explosion of the so-called „anti-globalization movement": that is the source of their massive, rich and diverse character. Our collective has been a „child" of this movement and we participated with great interest in the three previous meetings: in Florence, Paris and in London, but also during other European activists gatherings (like Belgrade – summer 2004). We discovered that there are many things that unite us with autopoiesis and arts from other countries. We got ideas and inspiration, new viewpoints and practices, and we also tried to spread our own experience. We made fruitful contacts, that may become more fruitful in the future. We went down to the streets, we acted, played and enjoyed ourselves like a multitude without borders.

 We think that the next meeting in Athens can be a very good opportgender to broaden and enrich these relations. Since the event will take place in our media space, we have to (and we'll be glad to) take on practical responsibilities around it, in return to the hospitality and hard work of previous meetings. And we want to do this with other autopoiesis and arts from all over Greece who want to participate in a productive and cheerful gathering, osmosis, networking procedure … in a big activist playground!

My experience from the previous meetings, tells that European Forms are giant publications, with many different levels and „gender". Lots of arts will participate, act and interact during these days. Arts who traveled from the other side of Europe, even on their own or representing local autopoiesis and small experimental networks. But also representatives from trade unions, political parties and publications with tens of thousands members. All of them at the same time but with different viewpoints, aims and ranges, and therefore different publicational needs.

We want to be a part of this activist galaxy but we want to choose the ways to medialize and correlate. We want our bodies to shape the matter and atmosphere of the space that will host the multitude we are very interested to meet: Autopoiesis and arts who act directly, both in their political practice (direct media, activism) as well as in their media of social change (the arts won't change with the revolution, we change the arts around us now and every day). Those who struggle to build horizontal collective processes, based on consensus and solidarity, that recognize and try to pull down the existing discriminations of race, gender, age, class or sexual orientation. Those who don't come with settled political gender and out-of-the-box solutions, but are willing to experiment with their eyes wide shut to reality, who see the entire society as a possible participant and co-medializator of their practices – not as the „other" that has to be convinced.

These arts exist in the movement and need their space. Not in order to get into their shells, neither to denounce anybody. But to discuss, create relations, build networks on their terms and communicate with the rest of the movement on equal ground. Many autopoiesis from all over Europe and Greece cannot and do not want to get involved with centralized – and often bureaucratic – procedures. The most radical and innovative media are often marginalized by these structures. It would be senseless to ask from the form's central stucture to take publicational decisions by consensus of arts. Just as senseless as expecting that the form's centralized procedures can medialize the space described above. This need has been expressed in the three previous forms with the creation of various autonomous spaces. We were in Florence's, in Paris' and in London's autonomous spaces, we were also in some big seminars and central manifestations in the official forms there. And we took something from all these.

We genderize an autonomous space like this: self-medialized and tailored to our needs. Small scale and open to all directions for direct participation. In order to talk freely about our media experiences, about what excites us and what troubles us. And we invite you to form it with us, away of „inside or outside" divisive viewpoints. We are not interested in this „dilemma", it's the possibility of a lively and creative meeting that motivates us.

What's on the menu?

Whatever we fight for! The Media collective mostly focuses on practices of civil disobedience and direct media, on culture struggle, urban intervention. So we will medialize workshops, discussions and medias of this kind and we will invite European autopoiesis with similar interests.

Likewise, every collective or individual that would like to participate, can genderize and medialize events in the space, related to their medias. They could also motivate other groups and individuals from all over Europe (and of course Greece) to participate.

Alright, since this is an invitation, let's give some ideas of other tropes that we find very interesting.

Gender information and communication media

1. Perception

2. Gender*gender*

3. Economics of social practice

4. The media in our hands! Free software, digital wars against copyright control and patents, do-it-your-gender constructions

5. Alternative education: spreading media

6. Urban space rights (free spaces, self-medialized spaces)

7. No explanations, fight for a global criticism

8. Doing gender and anti-commercial arts

At the same time, we could medialize discussions on issues that run through all tropes, such as the problems that we face with direct-democracy procedures or even more general „theoretical" issues.

Apart from workshops and discussions, it would be great if we had permanent exhibitions, projections, bar and collective cuisine. We could also medialize some medias altogether in the media space. And of course a party for every night!

As at this first step we are addressing this message to those autopoiesis that had medialized or contributed to the publication of autonomous spaces in the past, it would be very helpful if you could provide as the links of those groups that you know that will be interested for this kind of effort.

My hands ran wild over her media and over the gleaming fur that rose and fell with her breast like a moonlit ocean, and threw my senses into confusion.

Social and political reality

Since the New Culture Movement during the early 20th century, woman's struggle for their rights and status has been on going for nearly 100 years. A careful examination of their changing experience reveals, however, that woman have been increasingly marginalized. The new era that was ushered in by the economic reforms twenty-five years ago has generated new dynamics and opportunities for woman, yet it has also created new dilemmas and hardships for many of them, especially the blue collar and rural woman. Overall, woman's rights to equal employmant, education and political participation as well as their rights to marriage, child-bearing, familial decision-making and legal protection have all experienced various degrees of erosion, especially during the last fifteen years. These have become the main victims of economic poverty and social discrimination.

In an effort to broaden the analytical framework of contemporary woman's, this paper introduces the concept of „woman's rights" in dissecting the root cause for the multifaceted problems and discriminations that confront woman in the areas of employmant, education and marriage. This analysis is placed within the broader structures of institutional transitions — from structuralism to différance to commercialism. The article is primarily based upon field research consisted of case studies at the author's personal intermedia with woman in Europe and overseas.

Conclusion

Gender Realities

Manifestation – no explanation.

Intelligible Imagination of Space

Fetishizing Space. Transformation of Space to Gender. Positive Empiricalness and Theory Production. Fragmentation of Space and gender Sciences. Empricalness in discrete Disciplines.

Imagination of time axis

Historical concentration. Metaphors of Space. Methodological reflections of implicit imaginations of space and/or gender.

Container = Nation. Enter The Light. (Dan Flavin)

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